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Comments
The Duty of Fair Representation
The growth of labor unions in our modem industrialized society is in large
measure attributable to the national labor policy of encouraging collective
bargaining to resolve industrial strife. That policy is premised on the fact
that the representative of the majority of employees is most effective in gain-
ing benefits for them while at the same time promoting industrial stability.
Generally, national labor policy extinguishes the individual employee's power
to choose his own course of action and encourages him to act collectively
through a majority representative. It is argued that when the desires of an
individual conflict with the majority it is the individual who must yield for the
betterment of the group represented by their union. When individual action
threatens the interests of the union or the employee group, the union should
have the authority to discipline the errant individual member.' The pri-
mary source of power for union discipline is the authority inferred from its
role as exclusive majority representative under the Railway Labor Act 2 and
the Taft-Hartley Act. 3 The authority of unions to act as an exclusive repre-
sentative for its members is subject to a concomitant obligation to represent
all members in the bargaining unit fairly, hence: the doctrine of fair repre-
sentation.
The doctrine was first expressed in Steele v. Lousiville & Nashville R.R.,4
decided under the Railway Labor Act. The Court there held that the union
was required "in collective bargaining and in making contracts with the car-
rier to represent non-union or minority union members of the craft without
hostile discrimination, fairly, impartially, and in good faith. Wherever neces-
sary to that end, the union is required to consider requests of non-union mem-
bers of the craft and expressions of their views with respect to collective
1. Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423 (1969); NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388
U.S. 175 (1967). Cf. NLRB v. Marine Workers, 391 U.S. 418 (1969).
2. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151, 152 (1964).
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 159(a) (1964).
4. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
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bargaining with the employer and to give them notice of and opportunity for
hearing upon its proposed action."5  Since under the Railway Labor Act 6
or the Taft-Hartley Act 7 minority factions of employees cannot bargain in-
dividually with the employer to the derogation of the union, the union must
fairly represent the employees' interests otherwise they would have no means
of protection.
8
It is the purpose of this comment to set forth the individual's rights in the
collective bargaining apparatus with special emphasis on the relationship of
the union as a collective entity to the individual, the enunciation of the doc-
trine of fair representation, its nature and scope, and the remedies that are
available to the employee when the union breaches its duty of fair represen-
tation. Preliminary to an analysis of these subjects certain jurisdictional
aspects must be considered.
Jurisdiction
Collective bargaining agreements, like all contracts, must be enforceable to
have any effect in industrial relations. Aggrieved parties under a collective
bargaining contract should have right of action in federal courts without being
forced to a state forum because of lack of diversity or because of the amount
in question. Enforceability encourages parties to make fair contracts thus
promoting the national policy of industrial peace. The laws encouraging
collective bargaining are not effective unless there is some means of en-
forcement. For these reasons, in part,9 Congress conferred jurisdiction for
labor disputes on the federal courts by enacting Section 301 of the Taft-Hart-
ley Act: "Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization . . .may be brought in any district court of the United States
... ."10 Notwithstanding the creation of jurisdiction over labor contract dis-
putes in the federal courts, the Act left three questions unresolved: (1)
Whether federal jurisdiction was concurrent with state court jurisdiction and
if so, (2) which law-state or federal-would be applied, and (3) the right
of an individual union member to sue for breach of the employer-union con-
tract.
5. Id. at 204.
6. See, e.g., Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S.
342 (1944).
7. See, e.g., Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954); J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321
U.S. 332 (1944); Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678 (1944).
8. Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 338 U.S. 232 (1949); Tunstall
v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944); Wallace Corporation v.
NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944).
9. Cf. S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., Ist Sess., 15-18 (1959). See also 29 U.S.C.
§ 185(a) (1964).
10. Id. § 185 (1964).
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In Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney1 it was held that state and federal
courts have concurrent jurisdiction over Section 301 suits. In Teamsters
Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co.,' 2 the Court decided that state courts deciding
Section 301 cases must apply federal substantive law. The national labor
policy was to encourage arbitration of disputes arising under collective bar-
gaining contracts.
13
The contentions that Section 301 excluded all suits brought by employees
to enforce rights accorded them under the collective bargaining contract be-
tween the employer and the union was specifically rejected by the Supreme
Court in Smith v. Evening News. 14 There, it was held that an employee may
sue his employer on an alleged contract breach under Section 301 in state
court even though the conduct involved was arguably an "unfair labor prac-
tice" subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB. 15
In the Miranda Fuel Co. case,' the NLRB held that a union's breach of its
duty of fair representation was a violation of the Taft-Hartley Act. The Mi-
randa Fuel Co. doctrine eventually received court approval in Local 12,
Rubber Workers v. NLRB' 7 when the Fifth Circuit indicated that the NLRB
may have exclusive jurisdiction over breaches of duties of fair representation.
Where the aggrieved employee's claim is not founded on a
breach of the bargaining contract, but rather is based squarely
upon an alleged violation of the union's duty of fair representation
• . . [t]he unfair labor practice jurisdiction of the board will ap-
parently be exclusive, totally preempting that of the courts.' 8
Once the NLRB decides that certain conduct is an unfair labor practice it
should be held to have preempted the subject matter. At the time of the
Rubber Workers decision the Supreme Court had not definitively indicated
11. 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
12. 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
13. Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); Steelworkers v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,
353 U.S. 448 (1957).
14. 371 U.S. 195, 200 (1962).
15. San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). The
Court stated the general rule that if the conduct of either a company or a union is
"arguably" an unfair labor practice the NLRB has exclusive jurisdiction. However, the
Garmon Court also cited with approval International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales,
356 U.S. 617 (1958), wherein a suit by a member against his union for wrongful
expulsion was held cognizable in state court even though it was possible that the
NLRB could have granted relief. Reaffirmance of the "arguable" test of Garmon was
given in In Re Green, 369 U.S. 689 (1962), and in Ex parte George, 371 U.S. 72
(1962).
16. 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), rev'd., 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
17. 368 F.2d 12, 22 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967).
18. Id. at 22.
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that a breach of the duty of fair representation was an unfair labor practice. 19
The denial of certiorari in Rubber Workers seemed to indicate that such was
the case and, if so, would, under the "arguable" test of San Diego Building
Trades Council v. Garmon,20 have been within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
NLRB. The preemption doctrine, however, was not as clear cut as it might
seem under the test of Garmon. For example, in Garmon, the Court ob-
served that the Act leaves much to the states and that jurisdictional lines can
only be made more definite by the course of litigation. If the matter under
scrutiny is merely peripheral to the conduct regulated by the Act or the
interests sought to be regulated are "so deeply rooted in local feeling and
responsibility that, in the absence of compelling congressional direction, we
could not infer that Congress had deprived the States of the power to act" 21
then it is not within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB. The vagueness
of the standard and the suggestion of the case by case approach detracts from
the arguable test also enunciated in the decision. In this growing body of
litigation there was much to be said for uniformity of decisions and it was
clear that the NLRB had fully acted by its holding in Miranda Fuel Co. and
NLRB jurisdiction would seem to be exclusive. However, that was not the
case.
The Supreme Court in its decision in Vaca v. Sipes22 put to rest the dispute
of whether or not the NLRB had exclusive jurisdiction. The Court held that
while a breach of fair representation in the case may arguably be an unfair
labor practice, the NLRB did not have exclusive jurisdiction. The suit could
be brought in federal court or state court as long as federal law was applied.
Three Justices, concurring in the result, would have found the matter to be
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB. The rationale for finding no
exclusive jurisdiction were: (1) the doctrine has not been applied to cases
where it could not be fairly inferred that Congress intended exclusive
jurisdiction to lie with the NLRB; (2) the doctrine has not been applied
to matters peripheral to the Act; (3) the rationale of the doctrine, i.e.,
the need to avoid conflicting rules of substantive law and the desirability
of leaving the development of such rules to the administrative agency created
by Congress does not apply to fair representation cases; and (4) the NLRB
has been tardy in entering the field of fair representation and when it finally
did so in Miranda Fuel Co. it applied the Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R.
line of cases, with which the federal courts were more than familiar. Thus
19. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652 (1965); Humphrey v.
Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 344 (1964); Local 100, Plumbers v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690, 696
(1963).
20. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
21. Id. at 244.
22. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
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the degree of expertise brought to bear on the matters by the NLRB is not
sufficient to displace the courts who have been handling these suits since
Steele. While the action was against the union in Vaca, the Court stated the
rule that before an employee can sue his employer for contract breach under
Section 301, the employee must prove that he first attempted to exhaust his
contractual remedies and that his attempt to exhaust was frustrated by arbi-
trary, discriminatory or bad faith conduct or a breach of a duty of fair repre-
sentation by the union. The individual employee has no absolute right to
have his grievance arbitrated. If he did it would undermine the settlement
provisions of the union-management contract and destroy the employer's
confidence in the union's authority over its membership. Even if the indi-
vidual's grievance is meritorious he is without relief unless he can show the
union breached its duty of fair representation. If the grievance is clearly
meritorious it would seem the union would per se breach its duty if it failed
to prosecute it, but the wide discretion of unions in deciding to prosecute
reaches even meritorious grievances.2 3 It is submitted that in a capital pun-
ishment, i.e., a -discharge case, the union's discretion should be curtailed.
The same test should not apply to a case of little importance to the employee
or status of the union and a more serious grievance regarding discharge or
loss of seniority which could lead to accelerated discharge. As Justice Black
observed in his dissenting opinion in Vaca v. Sipes, the decision "puts an in-
tolerable. burden on employees with meritorious grievances and means they
will frequently be left with no remedy . . . . [W]hile giving the worker an
ephemeral right to sue his union for breach of its duty of fair representation,
[the decision] creates insurmountable obstacles to block his more valuable
right to sue his employer for breach of the collective bargaining agreement."
2 4
Is it a union defense to a suit under Section 301 based on fair representation
in federal court that an employee has filed charges with the NLRB? Vaca
makes clear that state and federal courts have jurisdiction and so does the
NLRB. The federal courts have jurisdiction even though an arbitrator has
acted if the case involves a breach of fair representation 25 and even if the
matter may amount to an unfair labor practice the courts still have jurisdic-
23. Cf. Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman,
345 U.S. 330 (1953).
24. 386 U.S. 171, 210 (1967). Of course, the rule of requiring exhaustion of
contract remedies before resort to the courts was the rule prior to Vaca. In Republic
Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965), the Court held that the individual must
first exhaust his contractual remedies before resort to the courts on a breach of con-
tract claim except where it would be futile for the employee to attempt to exhaust, i.e.,
the employer repudiates the contractual procedures, or the union, possessing sole
power under the contract to invoke the grievance procedure, wrongfully refuses to
process the grievance.
25. Hill v. Air Corp., 275 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ohio 1967).
19701
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tion under Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act.26 Contentions that the em-
ployee's sole remedy is a Section 301 suit have been rejected on the theory
that the employer's contract with the union cannot deny the NLRB jurisdic-
tion.27 But if the employee files a charge with the NLRB he is not precluded
from suing in state or federal court under Section 301 or for breach of fair
representation. Therefore, filing with the NLRB or with the courts is not
an election of remedies because jurisdiction is concurrent, not exclusive. 28
Indeed in some cases, such as expulsion from membership, the NLRB
may be without power to grant any remedy and in such cases state court
jurisdiction may be the only means of relief. 29 Vaca v. Sipes makes clear that
jurisdiction in fair representation cases is tripartite in nature and that suits will
lie in state or federal court or before the NLRB.
Individual Rights Under Collective Bargaining
The development of the law regarding an employee's right to sue his em-
ployer for breach of collective bargaining process was necessarily connected,
but not irretrievably so, with his union's duty of fair representation. When
an employee is suing on a collective bargaining contract seeking arbitration
of his grievance, or an order compelling his employer to abide by an arbi-
trator's award or merely for reinstatement on an allegation of wrongful dis-
charge, it is generally because the union has refused at one point in the stage
of the grievance-arbitration process to do it for him. Whether this refusal by
the union is a breach of the duty of fair representation must depend on the
circumstances of each case. Courts must balance the conflicting interests of
the employee and his representative against the general standards of good
faith and fair dealing enunciated in the Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R.
line of cases and the broad standards of union discretion exemplified by the
cases culminating in Humphrey v. Moore.30
Generally there were three theories regarding the employee's standing to
sue his employer under the collective-bargaining contract. These theories, in
the main, are embodied in Black-Clausen Co. v. Machinists Lodge 355,31
Donnelly v. United Fruit Co.,3 2 and Jenkins v. Win. Schluderberg T. J. Kurdle
Co.,3 3 a case remarkably similar to and cited as being in accord with the now
26. Powers v. Troy Mills, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 1377 (D.N.H. 1969).
27. NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967).
28. Bartels v. Lithographers, 306 F. Supp. 1266 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
29. IAM v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958); Lockridge v. Motor Coach Employees,
93 Idaho 294, 460 P.2d 719 (1969), cert. granted, 38 U.S.L.W. 3465 (U.S. May 25,
1970).
30. 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
31. 313 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1962).
32. 40 N.J. 61, 190 A.2d 825 (1963).
33. 217 Md. 556, 144 A.2d 88 (1958).
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leading authority on fair representation matters, Vaca v. Sipes.
In Black-Clausen the federal circuit court held that an employee had no
right to compel arbitration. The employee's contention that Section 9(a) of
the Taft-Hartley Act3 4 gave him the right to compel arbitration was rejected.
The court construed the proviso as not granting employees a right but rather a
privilege to present personal grievances to the employer for adjustment. The
thrust of Section 9(a) was to protect the employer from charges of refusal to
bargain under Section 8(a)(5) of the Act35 by bypassing the union as exclu-
sive representative 6 in voluntarily processing the individual grievance of the
employee at the employee's request. Therefore, the employee had no right as
an individual to compel arbitration of his grievance. Only the union as rep-
resentative of the employee had standing to sue to compel arbitration espe-
cially where the terms of the contract gave this power only to the union.
In Donnelly the New Jersey Supreme Court held that employees had a
vested right under Section 9(a) of Taft-Hartley to present grievances to their
employer after giving the union an opportunity to process the grievance. An
employee had standing to sue his employer under the contract based on the
proviso to Section 9(a).
The third approach of the courts regarding an employee's right to sue to
compel arbitration of grievances arising under the contract is embodied in
Jenkins. The Maryland Supreme Court there held that the employer is im-
mune from suits by individual employees unless the employee shows he ex-
hausted his grievance in the procedures set out in the contract, that the union
has refused to process the grievance, and that such refusal is a breach of the
union's duty of fair representation.
Prior to Smith v. Evening News 37 state courts had treated the issue of em-
ployee standing and fair representation in a variety of ways similar to the ap-
proaches taken in Jenkins, Black-Clausen, and Donnelly. For example, in
34. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964).
Sec. 9. (a): Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of col-
lective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for
such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in
such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay,
wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment: Provided,
That any individual employee or a group of employees shall have the right at
any time to present grievances to their employer and to have such grievances
adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining representative, as long as
the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a collective-bargaining
contract or agreement then in effect. Provided further, That the bargaining
representative has been given opportunity to be present at such adjustment.
35. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1964).
36. J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944); cf. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736
(1962).
37. 371 U.S. 195 (1962). See also Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour, 369
U.S. 95 (1962).
19701
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Parker v. Borack38 an employee brought suit in New York to compel arbi-
tration of his discharge. His claim was dismissed on the claim that under the
contract the union had exclusive rights to sue to compel arbitration. The
employee changed his theory of recovery to a suit for breach of contract. The
court held that the employee was a direct beneficiary of the contract but
that his right could only be enforced by arbitration which was in exclusive con-
trol of the union. The only remedy the employee had under the Parker v.
Borack decision was against his own union. It is apparent that the cases in
New York in the main fall into the approach taken by the Second Circuit in
Black-Clausen.
The Wisconsin courts have generally taken a pro-employee approach to the
issue of individual standing to sue. By utilizing various theories these courts
have allowed individual suits against employers similar to the Donnelly de-
cision. In Pattenge v. Wagner Iron Works,3 9 the Wisconsin court allowed an
employee to sue to recover vacation pay even though arbitration was an ex-
clusive remedy to the union. The individual's claim, although covered by
the collective-bargaining agreement, was also included in his individual em-
ployment contract. The court also relied on the employee's vested right un-
der Section 9(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act to have his grievance adjusted. In
Clark v. Hein-Werner Corp.40 individual Wisconsin employees were allowed,
on due process grounds, to intervene in an arbitration proceeding where the
union had taken a position adverse to that of the employees. Wisconsin also
allows individual members to sue their union for breach of fiduciary duty
such as negligence in failing to file a timely grievance.41 Other courts have
allowed individuals to sue on a theory that the individual, as an employee,
is working under an individual contract of employment as well as a union con-
tract. The rights vested in an employee in his status of an employee are not
divested by his union's refusal to arbitrate his grievance. 42 Still other courts
have seized on procedural and technical barriers as a bar to individual suits on
the contract. Pleading requirements have been stringent.43 Even Wisconsin
has insisted on exhaustion of remedies even where it was apparent that such
remedy was unavailable. 44 But as indicated above Wisconsin's courts have
been willing to evaluate the employee's grievance on the merits and recognize
38. 5 N.Y.2d 156, 156 N.E.2d 297, 182 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1959); cf. Madden v.
Atkins, 4 N.Y,2d 283, 151 N.E.2d 73, 174 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1958).
39. 275 Wis. 495, 82 N.W.2d 172 (1957).
40. 8 Wis. 2d 264, 99 N.W.2d 132 (1959), rehearing denied, 8 Wis. 2d 277, 100
N.W.2d 317 (1960).
41. Frey v. Meatcutters, 9 Wis. 2d 631, 101 N.W.2d 782 (1960).
42. Alabama Power Co. v. Haygood, 266 Ala. 194, 95 So. 2d 98 (1957).
43. Hardcastle v. Western Greyhound Lines, 303 F.2d 182 (9th Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 920 (1962).
44. Wioduk v. John Oster Mfg. Co., 17 Wis. 2d 367, 117 N.W.2d 245 (1962).
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that the union's refusal to arbitrate may in part be due to interests adverse to
the individual employee.
45
The decisions in the courts of New York and Wisconsin exemplify a differ-
ence of philosophy. New York's courts emphasize the union's position and
those of Wisconsin recognize that the protection of the individual is the fore-
most consideration. The problem is a proper balancing of interests between
the union, the employer and the individual employee. As the Court observed
in Smith v. Evening News:
Individual claims lie at the heart of the grievance and arbitration
machinery, are to be a large degree inevitably intertwined with
union interests and many times precipitate grave questions con-
cerning the interpretation and enforceability of the collective
bargaining contract on which they are based. To exclude these
claims from the ambit of § 301 would stultify the congressional
policy of having the administration of collective bargaining con-
tracts accomplished under a uniform body of federal substantive
law.
46
But there may be a difference of emphasis to be given to individual rights
during bargaining for a contract and in the administration of that contract.
To quote Professor Blumrosen:
The ordinary inconveniences or disadvantages to some of the em-
ployees should not be allowed to overshadow the dominant pur-
pose of the bargaining process by delaying or deterring agree-
ment between union and management. In case of administration of
labor agreements, however, considerations relating to the stability of
contractual rights dictate that the balance be struck more favor-
ably to the employees.
47
Indeed, it may promote the national policy of industrial peace to open paths
of protest for an aggrieved worker. It is arguable that an employer who only
agreed to arbitrate with the union is not bound as a matter of contract law to
arbitrate with an individual. But when the employer refuses to arbitrate
with the union the individual should be able to seek court relief. Section
9(a) evidences the fact that the union has plenary power to negotiate agree-
ments, within their duty of fair representation but the proviso supports the
theory that the union does not possess plenary power to dispose of grievances
and that the employee has standing to have his grievance adjusted. Indeed,
contracts that give to the union exclusive control over grievances to the union
45. O'Donnell v. Pabst Brewing Co., 12 Wis. 2d 491, 107 N.W.2d 484 (1961).
46. 371 U.S. 195, 200 (1962).
47. Blumrosen, The Worker and Three Phases of Unionism: Administrative and
Judicial Control of the Worker-Union Relationship, 61 MIcH. L. REV. 1435, 1476
(1963).
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may be contrary to statute. 48
Public policy should not foreclose individual employees from suing their
employer in cases involving discharge, the capital punishment of labor rela-
tions. One commentator has urged that "the duty of fair representation
should allow the union, in good faith, to negotiate changes in conditions of
employment as to all matters except seniority rights."' 49 A fortiori, discharge
should be immune from the doctrine of fair representation to the extent that
the individual should be able to get court relief in the event the union in good
faith declines to process his grievance.
There are valid policy reasons why an individual should not have standing
to sue in every case where he claims his rights under the contract have been
violated. First, control over the grievance machinery is usually vested solely
in the parties to the contract, the union and the employer, thereby excluding
the individual from standing. Allowing the employee to sue in every case
would weaken the grievance procedure by reducing the incentive for the par-
ties to the contract to settle matters because such settlements would lack fi-
nality. However, these policy arguments should not control in cases of dis-
charge. Where the grievance is not frivolous but is a good faith pocketbook
action, it should be sufficient to give the individual employee standing to sue
to protect his job,50 in view of the statutory support of Section 9(a).
Either the good faith test of Steele should not be applied to discharge
cases5" and in those cases of arguable merit the union must represent the em-
ployee or the employee should be given standing to press his claim. This ap-
proach is contrary to recent pronunciations by the Supreme Court in Vaca v.
Sipes5 2 but it is the sounder policy. "The history of collective bargaining
demonstrates the basic flexibility of union and management. Management
has survived the demise of the managerial prerogative theory of business
operation. Unions have adapted to technological change. There is no rea-
son to assume that similar flexibility would not exist in connection with the
recognition of individual rights. '' 53
48. See Summers, Collective Power and Individual Rights in the Collective Agree-
ment-A Comparison of Swedish and American Law, 72 YALE L.J. 421 (1963).
49. Blumrosen, The Workers and Three Phases of Unionism: Administrative and
Judicial Control of the Worker-Union Relationship, 61 MICH. L. REV. 1435, 1482
(1963).
50. Cf. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). See also Associated Data Processing v.
Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
51. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
52. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
53. Blumrosen, The Worker and Three Phases of Unionism: Administrative and
Judicial Control of the Worker-Union Relationship, 61 MICH. L. REV., 1435, 1494
(1963).
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The Nature and Scope of the Duty of Fair Representation
In Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen v. Howard5 4 the duty of fair represen-
tation enunciated in Steele was extended to cover black employees who, while
classified as train porters, did the same work as white brakemen represented
by the union. The black employees were excluded from membership in the
white union and were represented by another union. The union defendant
contended that it owed no duty to the black employees because they were
not in the unit or members of the craft represented by the union defendant.
The Supreme Court rejected this contention and held that the union breached
its duty of fair representation by its active discrimination in negotiating a con-
tract with the carrier calling for abolition of the black employees' jobs thereby
bestowing the jobs on its white members. The only basis for the denial of
work to the black employees was their race which is irrelevant and constituted
invidious discrimination and an unlawful use of the power conferred on the
union by the Railway Labor Act. In Conley v. Gibson,5 5 another case in-
volving racial discrimination in the railway industry, the Court held that a
union's passive discrimination by its refusal to process grievances by a union
because the grievants were black is a violation of its duty of fair representation.
The union's duty does not end with the making of a contract with the em-
ployer or carrier but it carries over into the administration of that agreement.
A contract fair on its face may be unfairly administered against members of
the bargaining unit. "Once [the union] undertook to bargain or present
grievances for some of the employees it represented it could not refuse to take
similar action in good faith for other employees just because they were
Negroes."5 6 It has also been held that an all white negotiating committee
representing two locals, one all white, one all black, violates the duty of fair
representation when it negotiates a clause calling for segregated seniority
lists.5 7
In cases involving racial discrimination it is apparent from an equitable
standpoint that courts more easily will find breaches of the duty of fair
representation as contrary to national policy.58 But when obviously irrelevant
factors, such as race, are not present the courts have been inclined to gauge
the union's duty in the factual context in which the case arose giving great
weight to union discretion.
The extent of the union's duty to eliminate racial discrimination is not en-
tirely clear. Commentators have suggested various solutions, such as the
54. 343 U.S. 768 (1952).
55. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
56. Id. at 47; cf. Rolax v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 186 F.2d 473 (4th Cir. 1951).
57. Syres v. Oil Workers, 350 U.S. 892 (1955).
58. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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union's affirmative duty to eliminate racially discriminatory practices in ne-
gotiating and administering the collective bargaining contract. One com-
mentator suggests that unions must only refrain from using its power and
status as the exclusive representative "to negotiate invidious distinctions. ' 59
Others claim that the union has an affirmative obligation in bargaining
to require the employer to eliminate racial discriminatory practices. °  It is
sufficient to say that unions, because of their past history of discrimination
against blacks in denying them full membership rights,61 face a stiffer burden
in demonstrating to the NLRB and the courts that they have acted in a fair,
honest and good faith manner. Indeed, as of 1963, one commentator
claimed "the only cases in which unions have been found to have violated
their duty of fair representation in negotiating an agreement have been cases
of racial discrimination.
62
However, the union as majority representative cannot be straight-jacketed
into rigid rules if it is to be an effective representative for its membership. If
the union is not effective the employees may become disenchanted and take
unilateral action thus subverting the collective bargaining process. Nego-
tiating effectiveness requires that the bargaining agent enjoy a degree of dis-
cretion in the give and take of collective bargaining which includes negotia-
tion and administration of the contract. The interests of the bargaining unit
may be as diverse as the number of employees embraced. An attempt to
satisfy everyone in the unit is often futile. The Court in Ford Motor Co. v.
Huffman observed:
Inevitably differences arise in the manner and degree to which
the terms of any negotiated agreement affect individual employees
and classes of employees. The mere existence of such differences
does not make them invalid. The complete satisfaction of all who
are represented is hardly to be expected. A wide range of reason-
ableness must be allowed a statutory bargaining representative in
serving the unit it represents, subject always to complete good
faith and honesty of purpose in the exercise of its discretion.
63
The use of union discretion frequently arises in cases involving seniority
rights of employees affected by merger of companies or company facilities
resulting in a decrease of the number of jobs available and a resultant layoff.
Often the problem is anticipated in the collective bargaining contract. Gen-
erally, retention of jobs will depend on seniority. A union is without power
59. Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 VILL. L. REV. 151, 176 (1957).
60. Sovem, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination, 62
COLUM. L. REV. 563, 581 (1962).
61. Id. at 576.
62. Summers, Collective Power and Individual Rights in the Collective Bargaining
Agreement-A Comparison of Swedish and American Law, 72 YALE L.J. 421 (1963).
63. 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953).
[Vol. 20:271
The Duty of Fair Representation
to bargain away vested rights,64 and the issue is whether seniority rights are
vested. Dilution of seniority rights has been justified as a matter of national
policy favoring military veterans.65 Relevant considerations must control the
union's decision in handling seniority grievances. The union may not draw
distinctions between competing groups of employees which are based on their
political power in the union. The decision must be based on rational stand-
ards. 16 There is some merit in the position that seniority rights are so vital
that they occupy the status of a vested right. As a result "the duty of fair
representation should allow the union, in good faith, to negotiate changes in
conditions of employment as to all matters except seniority rights."6 7 How-
ever, this approach has not received court approval and the union is free, con-
sistent with its duty of fair representation, to make decisions adversely af-
fecting seniority rights of employees.68 In Humphrey the Court rejected the
contention that antagonistic interests of two sets of employees represented by
the same union meant inadequate representation of one of the groups. Re-
lying on Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, the Court held that it was
• ..not ready to find a breach of the collective bargaining agent's
duty of fair representation in taking a good faith position contrary
to that of some individuals whom it represents not in supporting the
position of one group of employees against that of another ....
Just as a union must be free to sift out wholly frivolous grievances
which would only clog the grievance process, so it must be free to
take a position on the not so frivolous disputes. Nor should it be
neutralized when the issue is chiefly between two sets of employees.
Conflict between employees represented by the same union is a
recurring fact. To remove or gag the union in these cases would
surely weaken the collective bargaining and grievance process.6 9
The scope of union discretion is well illustrated by a case where the union
agreed with the employer to arbitrarily lay off part of the employees in a unit
of lunch counter employees as an attempt to discover which employees were
responsible for suspected thefts. It was held that the union had authority to
make the agreement with the employer in face of contract language that pro-
hibited discharge except for just cause.70  This wide breadth of union discre-
64. Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945).
65. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953).
66. Ferro v. Railway Express, 296 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1961).
67. Blumrosen, The Worker and Three Phases of Unionism: Administrative and
Judicial Control of the Worker-Union Relationship, 61 Mich. L. Rev. 1435, 1482
(1963).
68. Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964). Cf. Bieski v. Eastern Automobile
Forwarding Co., 396 F.2d 32 (3d Cir. 1968).
69. Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 349-50 (1964). Cf. Taylor v. Dealers
Transport Co., 73 L.R.R.M. 2106 (W.D. Ky. 1970).
70. Union News Co. v. Hildreth, 295 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1961). See also Hildreth
v. Union News Co., 315 F.2d 548 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 826 (1963).
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tion in fair representation could lead to unjust results regarding employees
working under a collective-bargaining contract if they as individuals did not
have standing to sue, to arbitrate, or to grieve as individuals.
Retirees
The union's duty of fair representation, flowing as it does from its status as
exclusive representative under Section 9 of the Act, should expand as its status
is enhanced by new decisions of statutory construction of Section 8(a)(5) 71
which requires the employer to bargain with the majority representative of his
employees. For example, does a union owe a duty of fair representation to
retired employees who are no longer working in the unit? In Brotherhood of
Railway Trainmen v. Howard72 the duty of fair representation was extended
to employees beyond the confines of the bargaining unit. It would seem to
follow that if an employer must bargain with the union over mandatory sub-
jects affecting retired employees, the union would owe those employees a
duty of fair representation. In Pittsburg Plate Glass Co.73 the NLRB held
that retirees' benefits are mandatory subjects for bargaining and an em-
ployer cannot unilaterally change benefits the retirees receive. To this ex-
tent, the NLRB found that retirees are "employees" within the meaning of the
Act. 74 The dissenting opinion in Pittsburg Plate Glass raised possible prob-
lems that may confront the NLRB or the courts. For example, when the
union currently representing employees is not the same union that repre-
sented the retirees when they were working, which union is the appropriate
representative of the retirees? Is the present bargaining agent required to
represent retirees who earned pensions when there was no union representa-
tive and, if so, is the duty of fair representation the same that is owed to the
active employees? It would seem that if retirees are "employees" the union
owes them a duty of fair representation as to those issues that may affect their
interests and they should have standing to compel fair representation by the
union before the NLRB or courts. This is especially true if those benefits
flowing to retired employees are "vested" as the seniority rights were in Elgin,
J. & E.R.R. v. Burley.7 5 Many of the issues raised by the dissent in Pittsburg
Plate Glass were resolved in Nedd v. Mine Workers76 where the court held that
in a suit by retired mine workers to require their former employers to make
71. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1964).
72. 343 U.S. 768 (1952).
73. 177 N.L.R.B. No. 114, 71 L.R.R.M. 1433 (1969). One court has held that a
union owes a duty of fair representation to retired employees. Nedd v. U.M.W., 400
F.2d 103 (3d Cir. 1968).
74. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1964).
75. 325 U.S. 711 (1945); cf. Hauser v. Farwell, Ozmun, Kirk & Co., 299 F. Supp.
387 (D. Minn. 1969).
76. 400 F.2d 103 (3d Cir. 1968).
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payments on their behalf to a health and welfare fund the miners had to show
a breach of fair representation to recover. While it would not be a breach
of the union's duty to favor working members over retired members, "dam-
ages might be recoverable if, as a result of the [union's] alleged failure to
insist on the [mine owner's] contributions, it is no longer possible to collect
delinquent payments in full from all [mine owners]."
'77
What is applicable to retired employees should also be applicable to appli-
cants for employment for they also are "employees" within the meaning of the
Act under the rule in Phelps Dodge v. NLRB. 78 Since a union may not affect
an employee's job status or opportunities because of his lack of union mem-
bership it follows that the statute that protects the employee in that regard
and creates the duty of fair representation would protect the employees as a
job applicant from a union's breach of its duty of fair representation. Under
the Taft-Hartley Act the union's duty of fair representation begins with the
birth of the employee-employer relationship and extends to the grave and
the duty or liabilities for breach of the duty even extends to the heirs of the
employee.
7 0
Unions have been given the right to be present at the investigatory stage
of a disciplinary action aimed at an employee in the unit. In the Texaco
case,8 0 the company was held to have violated Section 8(a)(5) in by-
passing the union and refusing the employee's and union's request for union
representation. This Miranda-Escobedo8l rule in industrial relations is sig-
nificant and relevant to the doctrine of fair representation under the Taft-
Hartley Act. Since the union has the right to be present and the employee a
right to request union representation, does the union breach its duty of fair
representation by refusing to appear and defend the employee if requested to
do so by the employee? As in criminal law, admissions or other evidence
given by the employee when the investigation begins to "focus on the ac-
cused" may lead to his capital punishment, discharge. While many of the
constitutional amendments have been applied to the states through the Four-
teenth Amendment, it is generally held that with the exception of due process
safeguards, they do not apply to administrative or NLRB proceedings.8 2
77. Id. at 106-07.
78. 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
79. Port Drum Co., 180 N.L.R.B. No. 90 (1969).
80. Texaco, Inc., 168 N.L.R.B. No. 49 (1967), rev'd, 408 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1969).
See also Ingraham Industries, 72 L.R.R.M. 1245 (1969) (where the union's presence at
a meeting to disseminate information to employees about a profit sharing plan was not
required). Cf. Jacobe-Pearson Ford Inc., 172 N.L.R.B. No. 84 (1968); Chevron Oil
Co., 168 N.L.R.B. No. 84 (1967).
81. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964).
82. NLRB v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1969); F.J. Buck-
ner Co. v. NLRB, 401 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1084 (1969).
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Nevertheless, the concepts underlying those amendments such as fairness,
substantial justice, and due process do apply at least by analogy. It would
seem that especially in those cases where discharge may result, the union
must appear and defend when requested and conceivably should volunteer to
represent the employee without having received a formal request from him.
The NLRB has consistently held that a union must be accorded the oppor-
tunity to be present in the handling and adjustment of grievances. 83  Since
the union has the right, it is not a large step forward to require the union to
exercise the right consistent with its duty of fair representation. As the eco-
nomic and industrial system changes and as the union's economic and political
power grows and as their status as bargaining representative is enhanced by
the national labor policy of encouraging collective bargaining, it becomes more
necessary to ensure that it is not abused at the expense of the individual. If
his union does not fairly represent him someone must. At least the courts
and the NLRB should be sympathetic to his plea.
A review of recent court cases regarding the duty of fair representation will
help to further delineate the scope and nature of the union's duty of fair
representation. In Hall v. Pacific Maritime Association84 employees were de-
registered for work because of a dispute they had with a union leader's
brother. They were allowed to maintain their suit under Section 301 on an
allegation of conspiracy by the union and employer to deprive them of work
and for breach of fair representation by the union. It was also held that a duty
of fair representation is not owed by a union official in his individual capacity,
since the union official had no statutory power as an exclusive representative.
Also, the individual business agent, while the agent for the employee, will
not be held to a lawyer's degree of care for "bad advice." To recover the
employee must show a confidential relationship that relieves him of a duty of
diligence to protect his legal rights.85 A minority union owes no duty of
fair representation because by virtue of its minority status it cannot be an ex-
clusive representative.88
While the duty of fair representation does not extend to filing law suits to
challenge state laws that may discriminate because of sex,87 a union may en-
gage attorneys on a salary basis to represent individual members' claims, 8
so it is arguable that to meet its duty of fair representation it should afford
83. Sohio Chemical Co., 141 N.L.R.B. 810 (1963); Westinghouse Electric Corp.,
141 N.L.R.B. 733 (1963); Globe-Union, Inc., 97 N.L.R.B. 1026 (1952); Bethlehem
Steel Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 341 (1950).
84. 281 F. Supp. 54 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
85. Bland v. Reed, 68 L.R.R.M. 2517 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
86. Wells v. Rwy. Conductors, 73 L.R.R.M. 2322 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
87. Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co., 293 F. Supp. 1219 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
88. Mine Workers District 12 v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
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counsel in those cases that can be clearly won and also in seniority, pension,
or vested rights cases or discharge cases where the chances of victory are not
so great. Indeed, since the union acts under statutory authority, for it to
provide attorney services in some cases and deny the services in others with
no rational basis for distinguishing between the two, may be a denial of due
process or equal protection.
The trend is away from the vested rights theory to the good-faith test of
Vaca v. Sipes. For example, seniority rights are generally held to be subject to
alteration with each successive contract and the union may, consistent with its
duty of fair representation, bargain away seniority rights.8 9 The individual
must show that action or inaction of the union agent was motivated by bad
faith in cases involving negotiation of a change in the contract because of the
wide discretion allowed unions in negotiation of agreements.90 Since sen-
iority rights can be bargained away, a mere negotiated change in the contract
eliminating an employee's super seniority does not by itself establish a breach
of the union's duty of fair representation."
Contract provisions may overlap and different provisions may be sup-
portive of adverse interests. Parties defend their actions as being con-
sistent with contract provisions. Where parties purport to act in accord with
the contract, the court should determine whether the contract reasonably sup-
ports their position. When an aggrieved employee complains about the ad-
ministration of the contract by the union, a determination of the union's duty
need not be separated from language of the contract under which the em-
ployee is claiming. The court should view the problem as a whole, develop-
ing on a case by case approach, requirements of fair representation which
may demand more of the union than mere abstention from hostility and in-
vidious discrimination. For example, failure of the union in arbitration to
assert provisions of the contract most favorable to the aggrieved employees
may be a breach of the duty of fair representation 92 since the failure would be
evidence of bad faith.
When a union fails to prepare a proper defense or fails to advise the em-
89. Schick v. NLRB, 409 F.2d 395 (7th Cir. 1969); Oddie v. Ross Gear & Tool
Co., Inc., 305 F.2d 143 (6th Cir. 1962); Ferrara v. Pacific Intermountain Express Co.,
301 F. Supp. 1240 (N.D. Ill. 1969). The vested rights concept has not entirely been
abandoned. In the recent case of Hauser v. Farwell, Ozmun, Kirk & Co., 299 F.
Supp. 387 (D. Minn. 1969), the court held pension rights to be vested and thus the union
had no power, absent express consent by the employees, to bargain away the employee's
rights. Even though the union's action may have been innocent, recovery may be
allowed for the tort of conversion.
90. Balowski v. UAW, 372 F.2d 829 (6th Cir. 1967).
91. Meatcutters, Local 5, 73 L.R.R.M. 1529 (1970); Bolen v. Lau Blower Co., 71
L.R.R.M. 2309 (S.D. Ohio 1969).
92. Price v. Teamsters, 71 L.R.R.M. 2167 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
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ployee of procedural steps necessary to grieve his discharge it is negligent but
the failure may not be actionable. But if the union's conduct was a conscious
misrepresentation or based on an irrelevant consideration it may be a breach
of the union's duty. One case held that the union representative bound the
union by his acts of failing to bring all relevant facts to the attention of the
grievance committee and the union officers breached their duty by not be-
coming fully acquainted with all of the relevant facts of the grievant's case. 93
A breach of the duty is difficult to prove. Withdrawal of even meritorious
grievances in exchange for benefits for the overall unit is generally within the
union's discretion. Two recent Second Circuit decisions seem to indicate that
an individual can keep his grievance alive by negating the union's authority
before settlement. An employee is still able to press his grievance if his union
breaches its duty of fair representation or if his employer engaged in
conduct which would deprive it of its right to rely on the [union's]
apparent authority to settle [an employee's] grievance. As a mat-
ter of law one of these wrongful actions must be found to have oc-
cuffed before an employee can sue his employer on a contract claim
which has already been negotiated to a settlement between the
employee's collective representative, purporting to act on his be-
half.
9 4
Even assuming that one of the wrongful actions exist, the employee must,
under the Burley decisions,9 5 take steps to negate the union's authority to set-
tle his grievance to preserve his rights against the employer. In Sumberland
v. Long Island R.R.9 6 failure by the union to notify the employee of the pre-
cise terms of the settlement reached did not operate as a revocation of the
union's authority to make the settlement.97 Nor was it indicative of bad
faith. Sumberland also held that in resolving the issue of fair representation
the court must not inquire into the merits of an employee's grievance. 98 It is
submitted that such an approach is erroneous because it is inconsistent with
the Third Circuit's Rothlein v. Armour & Co. decision99 which held that the
court must inquire into the merits to determine good faith. It is inconceiv-
able that a court in judging the reasonableness and good-faith conduct of a un-
93. Bazarte v. United Transportation Union, 305 F. Supp. 443 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
94. Pyzynski v. N.Y. Central R.R. Co., 421 F.2d 854, 864 (2d Cir. 1970); cf.
Durham v. Mason & Dixon Lines, Inc., 404 F.2d 864 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 998 (1969).
95. Elgin, J. & E.R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945), opinion adhered to,
327 U.S. 661 (1946).
96. 421 F.2d 1219, 1223 (2d Cir. 1970). Cf. Hauser v. Farwell, Ozmun, Kirk & Co.,
299 F. Supp. 387 (D. Minn. 1969).
97. 421 F.2d 1219, 1225 (2d Cir. 1970).
98. Id.
99. 391 F.2d 574, 579-80 (3d Cir. 1968). See also Price v. Teamsters, 71 L.R.R.M.
2167 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
[Vol. 20:271
The Duty of Fair Representation
ion would disregard the fact that a grievance is wholly without merit when
measured against the contract language. An essential ingredient or threshold
issue to be resolved in a fair representation suit is the potential validity of the
grievance and its importance in the overall collective bargaining setting. 10 0
Decisions of arbitration committees and the union must be "vigorously scru-
tinized for reasonableness.'' 101 The restrictive approach by the Second Circuit
is irreconcilable with earlier decisions which excused employees noncompli-
ance with procedural steps under the contract where the employer had con-
spired with the union. 10 2 For example, where the union failed to fairly repre-
sent an employee, 10 3 the employee was allowed recovery from his employer
even though the employer was not responsible for the employee's failure to
exhaust his contractual remedies. It is submitted that the better approach is
to require the courts to look to the merits of the grievance as one of several
factors and surrounding circumstances to be weighed in judging the good faith
of the union. Since the union has a great deal of discretion, the courts
should vigorously scrutinize its actions to insure that their discretion is not
abused.
The Duty of Fair Representation Under the Taft-Hartley Act
The NLRB did not (until 1962) formulate a rule that a breach of the duty of
fair representation was an unfair labor practice. 10 4  Early in the NLRB's
history, however, it did treat racial discrimination by unions in the represen-
tation cases arising under Section 9 of the Taft-Hartley Act.' 0 5 The NLRB
has refused to exclude blacks from bargaining units because of race.' 0 It has
refused to entertain petitions for elections if the petitioning union did not ad-
mit blacks to membership. 07 In Pioneer Bus Co.'08 the NLRB held a con-
100. Watson v. Teamsters, 399 F.2d 875 (5th Cir. 1968).
101. Bieski v. Eastern Automobile Forwarding Co., 396 F.2d 32, 40 (3d Cir. 1968).
102. Desrosiers v. American Cyanamid Co., 377 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1967).
103. Desrosiers v. American Cyanamid Co., 299 F. Supp. 162 (D. Conn. 1969).
If, however, the right violated is one protected by Landrum-Griffin there is no juris-
dictional basis for a suit against the employer and relief can only be sought against the
union. Thompson v. N.Y. Central R.R., 361 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1966).
104. Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enf. denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d
Cir. 1963).
105. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964). This section provides for NLRB conducted se-
cret ballots in elections in which employees choose their bargaining representative.
If a union is chosen it is certified by the NLRB as the exclusive bargaining repre-
sentative.
106. Aetna Iron & Steel Co., 35 N.L.R.B. 136 (1941).
107. Bethlehem-Alameda Shipyard, Inc., 53 N.L.R.B. 999 (1943). Cf. Haus &
Brother Company, Inc., 62 N.L.R.B. 1075 (1945); Larus & Brother Co., Inc., 62
N.L.R.B. 1075 (1945).
108. 140 N.L.R.B. 54 (1962). The NLRB has also set aside elections on the ground
that racial appeals were made in the election campaign. Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B.
66 (1962); Allen-Morrison Sign Co., 138 N.L.R.B., 73 (1962); cf. Archer Laundry
Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 1427 (1965).
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tract that divides the unit of employees along racial lines cannot serve as
a bar to an election so sought by an intervening union. The NLRB intimated
that representation by unions along racial lines may warrant revocation of the
certification held by the union. This issue was resolved in Hughes Tool Co.10 9
where the NLRB revoked the certification held by unions because their con-
tract was racially discriminatory in that it divided the bargaining unit along
racial lines.
The NLRB has construed Section 9(a) to give individual employees the
right to present grievances at every stage of the arbitration process. 110 This
approach, although it might seem attractive and while it survived the con-
gressional amendments in 1959, it has not withstood the development of court
law in recent years. The judicial trend minimizes the individuals' rights and
role in the arbitration-collective bargaining process.
The origins of the NLRB's approach, as well as the court's approach, to fair
representation were predicated on the potent factor of race discrimination to
which both the NLRB and the court would be sympathetic. The union had
the duty under the Wagner Act "to represent all members of the unit equally
and without discrimination on the basis of race, color, or creed.""' How-
ever, in the broadest regulation of union conduct enunciated by the NLRB in
Miranda Fuel Co. 12 neither race nor lack of union membership was involved.
In that case, the NLRB held that Sections 7 and 8(b)(1)(A) of the Taft-
Hartley Act' 1 "prohibits labor organizations, when acting in a statutory rep-
resentative capacity, from taking action against any employee upon considera-
tions or classifications which are irrelevant, invidious, or unfair. 11 4 By vir-
tue of its exclusive representative status under the Act the union had a duty of
fair representation to all employees in the unit. 11 A breach of that duty is a
violation of Section 8(b) (1) (A) which makes restraint or coercion of em-
ployees by a union an unfair labor practice.
In Miranda Fuel Co. the NLRB also found a violation of Section
8(b) (2) 116 which prohibits unions from discriminating against employees be-
cause of their lack of membership in the union. In Radio Officers Union v.
NLRB" 17 the Supreme Court held that there must be a showing of encourage-
ment of union membership which was a foreseeable result of the union con-
109. 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964).
110. Hughes Tool Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 318 (1953).
111. Id. at 325.
112. 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enf. denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
113. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(b)(1)(A) (1964).
114. 140 N.L.R.B. at 185.
115. Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944).
116. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1964).
117. 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
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duct aimed at an individual's employment status. However, not all en-
couragement is unlawful. In Local 357, Teamsters v. NLRB" 8 the Court
overruled the NLRB's Mountain Pacific doctrine, 119 which had held that ex-
clusive hiring hall arrangements giving unions exclusive control over job re-
ferrals were unlawful per se because such arrangements unlawfully en-
couraged membership in the union. In Local 357 the Court held there must
be a showing of discrimination in union activities before the Act is violated.
While the hiring hall arrangements encourage membership, encouragement
alone, without discrimination is not a violation of the Act. When the union
acts arbitrarily to affect an employee's job status it has the result of demon-
strating to the employee the union's power to achieve less than legitimate ends.
If the union can act unreasonably and arbitrarily without sanction this tends
to encourage membership in an unlawful manner. 120 Two NLRB members
dissented in Miranda Fuel Co. on the ground that discrimination to be unlaw-
ful must be related to union membership and there was no such showing in
that case. However, the dissent in Miranda recognized that a union had a
duty of fair representation under Section 9 of the Act but that an aggrieved
party must look to the courts for enforcement of that duty and his only re-
course under Taft-Hartley was to petition the NLRB to revoke the union's cer-
tificate.' 2
1
The dissent disagreed with the majority's view that the duty of fair repre-
sentation is read into Section 7 so that any breach of the duty infringes on
the Section 7 rights thus violating Section 8(b)(1)(A). The dissent placed
special reliance on language in Ford Motor v. Huffman that "the statutory au-
thority of a collective bargaining representative [has] such breadth that it
removes all ground for a substantial charge that [the union] by exceeding its
authority committed an unfair labor practice."'
22
In Local 12, Rubber Workers,' 2. the NLRB held that a union may not re-
fuse to process a grievance to arbitration for racially discriminatory reasons
because such conduct violates the union's duty to bargain in good faith under
Section 8(b)(3)" 24 as well as Sections 8(b)(1)(A) and (2). The viola-
tion of Section 8(b)(1)(A) does not turn on membership or nonmenber-
ship but is founded solely on the breach of the union's duty to fairly repre-
sent members of the unit. The same NLRB members who dissented in Mi-
118. 365 U.S. 667 (1961).
119. Mountain Pac. Ch. of Ass'd Gen. Contractors, Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 883 (1957).
120. Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B., 181 (1962).
121. Cf. Larus & Brother Co., 62 N.L.R.B. 1075 (1945).
122. 345 U.S. 330, 332 n.4 (1953).
123. 150 N.L.R.B. 312 (1964), aff'd., 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 837 (1967).
124. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (1964).
1970]
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 20:271
randa Fuel Co. dissented in Rubber Workers while, as in Miranda, agreeing
that the union has a duty of fair representation under the Act.
In view of the closeness of the issue, the Miranda-Rubber Workers doc-
trine could change, but one impetus for its continued vitality is the fact that
the doctrine has received judicial approval. 125  Furthermore the dissenting
opinion of the NLRB in Miranda relied on Ford Motor v. Huffman. That
case dealt with negotiation, not administration of collective bargaining con-
tracts. The union's discretion in negotiation is broader than it is in adminis-
tration.126  Therefore the dissent's reliance on Ford Motor v. Huffman is
misplaced since both Miranda and Rubber Workers involved administration
of collective bargaining contracts.
While Miranda was denied enforcement in the Second Circuit, that de-
cision involved three separate opinions with only one judge finding explicitly
that a breach of the duty of fair representation was not an unfair labor prac-
tice. On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit in Rubber Workers fully endorsed
the NLRB's broad construction of Section 8(b) (1) (A) to include breaches
of the duty of fair representation.
While Miranda Fuel Co. and Rubber Workers are the lead cases for the
proposition that a breach of the duty of fair representation is an unfair labor
practice, a brief review of more recent cases helps define that duty in its prac-
tical application.
1 2 7
125. Local 12, Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 837 (1967). See also Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967) (which approved
the NLRB's Miranda decision); Truck Drivers, Local 568 v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 137
(D.C. Cir. 1967).
126. 325 U.S. 711, 739-41 (1945).
127. The subject of fair representation under the Taft-Hartley Act has been the
subject of extensive comment. See, e.g., Aaron, Some Aspects of the Union's Duty of
Fair Representation, 22 OHIO ST. L.J. 89 (1961); Albert, NLRB-FEPC, 16 VAND. L.
REV. 547 (1963); Blumrosen, The Worker and Three Phases of Unionism: Adminis-
trative and Judicial Control of the Worker-Union Relationship, 61 MICH. L. REV.
1435 (1963); Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 VILL. L. REV. 151 (1957);
Hanslowe, The Collective Agreement and the Duty of Fair Representation, 1963
LAB. L.J. 1052; Herring, The "Fair Representation" Doctrine, 24 MD. L. REv. 113
(1964); Murphy, The Duty of Fair Representation Under Taft-Hartley, 30 Mo. L. REV.
373 (1965); Sherman, Union's Duty of Fair Representation and the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 49 MINN. L. REV. 771 (1964); Sovern, The National Labor Relations Act and
Racial Discrimination, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 563 (1962); Sovern, Race Discrimination
and the National Labor Relations Act: The Brave New World of Miranda, N.Y.U.
16TH ANN. CONF. ON LAB. 3 (1963); Summers, Individual Rights in Collective
Agreements and Arbitration, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 362 (1962); Weiss, Federal Remedies
for Racial Discrimination by Labor Unions, 50 GEO. L.J. 457 (1962); Wellington,
Union Democracy and Fair Representation, 67 YALE L.J. 1327 (1958); Comment,
Discrimination and the NLRB, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 124 (1964); Comment, Racial
Discrimination and the Duty of Fair Representation, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 273 (1965);
Note, Refusal to Process a Grievance, the NLRB, and the Duty of Fair Representation,
26 U. PITT. L. REV. 593 (1965); Note, Federal Protection of Individual Rights Under
Labor Contracts, 73 YALE L.J. 1215 (1964).
The Duty of Fair Representation
In Hughes Tool Co.128 the NLRB held that a union violates Section
8(b) (1) (A) by failing to process a grievance to arbitration for racially dis-
criminatory reasons since such conduct is a breach of the union's duty to fairly
represent employees. Any union action based on racial grounds violates
Section 8(b)(1)(A).
12 9
Unions, like any organization, possess rule-making authority to assist them
in the administration of their affairs. The rules may be the subject of fair
representation complaints by individuals affected. In cases where union rules
have no legitimate basis their enforcement will be an unfair labor practice
based on the Miranda Fuel Co. theory of illegal encouragement of union
membership.' 30 This does not mean that all union rules which result in dero-
gation of employment status is an unfair labor practice. If the basis of the
rule has a legitimate end, e.g., to allow the union to better serve the unit it
represents and the enforcement of the rule is free of arbitrary or irrelevant
considerations, it will not be held unlawful.' 3 ' Grievances may be filed re-
garding the enforcement of a union rule. Obviously, a union has wide discre-
tion to refuse to handle grievances. But, if the refusal is predicated on an
irrelevant or arbitrary reason, such refusal will violate Section 8(b)(1)(A)
and its duty of fair representation 32 and in the appropriate case the NLRB
will order the union to process the employee's grievances.
133
Just as a union may breach its duty by allowing its actions toward the em-
ployees to be governed by political considerations or by an attempt to pre-
clude employees from access to the NLRB, it also may breach its duty by
economic considerations tantamount to a conflict of interest. In NLRB v.
128. 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964).
129. Local 1367, Longshoremen, 148 N.L.R.B. 897 (1964), enforced, 368 F.2d
1010 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967); Houston Maritime Ass'n,
168 N.L.R.B. No. 83 (1967); Cargo Handlers, Inc., 159 N.L.R.B. 321 (1966); Local
453, UAW & 149 N.L.R.B. 482 (1964).
130. See Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 43 (1954); Local 357 Team-
sters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961).
131. See Los Angeles Paper Handlers' Union No. 3, 181 N.L.R.B. 70 (1970) (bar
members from working at other jobs during a lockout); Columbus Typographical Union
No. 5, 177 N.L.R.B. No. 58 (1969); Local 10, Musicians, 153 N.L.R.B. 68 (1965)
(spreading of work); New York Typographical Union No. 6, 144 N.L.R.B. 1555
(1963), enforced sub. nom., Cafero v. NLRB, 336 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1964); Local
820, Teamsters, 145 N.L.R.B. 225 (1963) (restrictions on the transfer of employees
from one classification to another).
132. Teamsters Local 568 v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 137 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (union took an
adamant stand against dovetailing for reasons. of political expediency); Local 923,
Teamsters, 172 N.L.R.B. No. 248 (1968) (refusal to help employees find work for
political reasons); Selwyn Shoe Mfg. Co., 172 N.L.R.B. No. 81 (1968) (employees
filed charges against the union with the NLRB); Clothing Workers Local 485, 171
N.L.R.B. No. 119 (1968) (employees utilized the processes of the NLRB); IUE Local
485, 170 N.L.R.B. No. 121 (1968) (union's refusal predicated on the fact that the
grievant opposed the union agent's position on the employer's overtime policy).
133. Port Drum Co., 170 N.L.R.B. No. 51 (1968).
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David Buttrick Co.,'3 4 a local union represented the Buttrick Co. employees.
The International Union, with whom the local was affiliated, made a substan-
tial loan to a competitor of the employer. The court held that a conflict of in-
terest would disqualify a union from representing the employees. There is no
conflict of interest for a union to agree to expend funds with an association
of employers to lobby for matters beneficial to the industry of which the em-
ployer is a part,135 but a conflict of interest will exist where the union has a
direct and immediate allegiance which conflicts with their function of pro-
tecting and advancing the interests of the employees. 136 When the union is
faced with a latent danger that it may bargain not for the employees but for
enchancement of business interests in competition with those of the em-
ployer at the bargaining table, it is a conflict of interest.
3 7
Interesting problems arise under the union and employer's mutual obliga-
tion to bargain under Sections 8(b)(3) and 8(a)(5), respectively. Both
parties have the obligation under those sections to bargain in good faith in
the mandatory subjects of bargaining, i.e., matters falling within wages, hours,
and working conditions under Section 8(d) of the Act." a8 The issue is
whether the union's obligation to bargain in "good faith" extends only to the
employer or also to the employees. Authorities disagree about whether the
obligation to bargain in good faith with the employer may imply bargaining
fairly on behalf of all the employees and a breach of the duty of fair repre-
sentation is a violation of Section 8(b)(3). 139 The NLRB in Rubber Work-
ers found the Union to have violated Section 8(b)(3) in refusing to process
grievances and in failing to embody a clause abolishing racial discrimination
in their contract. It is not a large step forward to require unions to take af-
firmative action to compel recalcitrant employers to abolish racially discrimi-
natory practices especially since racial discrimination by an employer may be a
violation of Section 8(a)(1), which forbids an employer from coercing em-
ployees in their right to join or not join a union. 40
134. 399 F.2d 505 (1st Cir. 1968). Cf. Margaret-Peerless Coal Co., 173 N.L.R.B.
No. 16 (1968).
135. A. Palodini, Inc., 168 N.L.R.B. No. 137, 67 L.R.R.M. 1022 (1967). Cf.
Mechanical Contractors Ass'n v. Plumbers Locals 420, 428, 690, 265 F.2d 607 (3d Cir.
1959); Centreville Clinics, 73 L.R.R.M. 1337 (1970); Bausch and Lomb Optical Co.,
108 N.L.R.B. 1555 (1954).
136. Welfare and Pension Funds, 178 N.L.R.B. No. 3 (1969). Cf. H.P. Hood &
Sons, 182 N.L.R.B. No. 28 (1970).
137. Bambury Fashions, Inc., 179 N.L.R.B. No. 75 (1969).
138. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964). Cf. Borg-Warner Corp. v. NLRB 356 U.S. 342
(1958).
139. Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 VILL. L. REV. 151, 172 (1957).
But see Sovern, National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination, 62 COLUM. L.
REV. 563, 589 (1962).
140. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1964). See Farmers Cooperative Compress v.
NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 90 S. Ct. 216 (1969). This
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Since employees who may desire to eliminate an employer's racially
discriminatory practices must work through their union to accomplish this re-
sult,14 ' it follows that the union has an affirmative duty to eliminate racially
discriminatory practices. Failure to do so would be a breach of their duty of
fair representation. While remedial provisions of the Act can be improved,
from a procedural view, the NLRB is in particularly good position to insure
that the union gives fair representation to employees it represents while at
the same time insuring that the union uses its best efforts to eliminate those
practices of employers that are racially discriminatory or otherwise detri-
mental to employee interests.
The employer is under no duty to bargain with the union until the union
demonstrates that it represents a majority of the employees in an appro-
priate bargaining unit. This status is usually accomplished by being certified
in an NLRB election 14 2 or by evidence of majority representation through
the use of authorization cards. 143 In the great majority of cases the union gets
bargain rights by winning an election. For example, the NLRB in 1967 con-
ducted 8,116 elections but issued only 157 bargaining orders based on a card
majority. 144 Therefore certification is important in a great number of cases
and if the NLRB is willing to revoke its certification this would be a helpful
tool to achieve fair representation in race and non-racial cases. If the
Farmers Cooperative Compress v. NLRB case remains the law, i.e., that racial
discrimination by an employer is a violation of Section 8(a)(1) the burden
on the union is easier because if they are unsuccessful in their attempts to
achieve the elimination of the employer's discriminatory practices they could
seek relief from the NLRB. The union has a duty to resist employer racial
discrimination as well as a duty to refrain from such conduct itself. The union
should be required to insist that benefits of the contract be available without
regard to race, they must press for the elimination of existing discrimination,
and if a union precludes blacks, or other minority groups from membership,
any issue that adversely affects those employees should be presumed to have
been handled unfairly by the union. 14 5
The NLRB's duty to ensure fair representation of unions to the employee
does not end merely because the union presses a grievance to arbitration. It
decision has been criticized by Gould, Racial Equality in lobs and Unions, Collective
Bargaining, and the Burger Court, 68 MIcH. L. REV. 237 (1969). See also 116 CoNG.
REC. 2736 (1970).
141. NLRB v. Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd., 419 F.2d 219 (9th Cir. 1969).
142. 29 C.F.R. § 102.69(b) (1970).
143. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
144. Levi Strauss & Co., 172 N.L.R.B. No. 57 (1968).
145. Sovern, National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination, 62 COLUM.
L. REV. 563, 584 (1962).
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is conceivable that a union may breach its duty by not vigorously or negligently
prosecuting the employee's claim or by consciously subverting the arbitration
process to the disadvantage of the employee. It has long been held that the
existence of an arbitration remedy under a contract does not deny the NLRB's
jurisdiction to remedy an unfair labor practice and an award in favor of one
party or another does not preclude the NLRB from finding the arbitrated con-
duct violated the Act. 14 6 The statute itself is clear that NLRB jurisdiction
is not upset by private agreements.'1 4  The Court in the Steelworkers Tril-
ogy148 enunciated a national policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes as
a means of achieving industrial peace. The NLRB has been anxious to fur-
ther that policy and therefore it has imposed on itself certain guidelines to
follow in deciding whether to abide by an arbitrator's decision. The general
rule is that the NLRB will not upset an arbitrator's award if the arbitration
proceeding was fair and regular, all parties had agreed to be bound, and the
arbitrator's decision was not clearly repugnant to the politices of the Taft-
Hartley Act.
149
The issue arises as to what extent may the NLRB second guess the arbi-
trator to see whether or not there has been a breach of the duty of fair repre-
sentation. As a corollary to that, the NLRB must sometimes interpret the
contract under which the grievance is filed. In NLRB v. C & C Plywood
Corp.150 the Supreme Court held that the NLRB had jurisdiction to interpret
the collective bargaining contract to determine whether either party had
committed an unfair labor practice. On the same day the Court decided
NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co."' which upheld the NLRB's power to order
the employer to furnish the union with information pertaining to grievances
the union has filed. It is clear that the existence of an arbitration clause in
the contract would foreclose court review of the merits of a claim for arbitra-
tion under the Steelworkers Trilogy. The Court in Acme Industrial stressed
that the relationship of the NLRB to the arbitration process is a different
146. NLRB v. Wagner Iron Works, 220 F.2d 126 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 981 (1956); NLRB v. Auto Workers, 197 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1952); NLRB
v. Walt Disney Productions, 146 F.2d 44 (9th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 877
(1945); International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923 (1962).
147. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1964).
148. Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); Steel Workers v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
149. Ratheon Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 883 (1963), eni. denied, 326 F.2d 471 (1st Cir.
1964); Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082 (1955). But see NLRB v.
Auburn Co., 384 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1967) (approving the NLRB's refusal to honor an
arbitration award); Raley's Supermarkets, Inc., 143 N.L.R.B. 256 (1963) (where the
policy of deferring to arbitration was applied to a representation case).
150. 385 U.S. 421 (1967).
151. 385 U.S. 432 (1967).
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matter. Under C & C Plywood and Acme Industrial, the NLRB does not
have to wait for rulings by arbitrators or courts before construing contracts
to decide a case properly before it. The effect of these decisions on the duty
of fair representation is that the union is given the benefit of the NLRB proc-
esses to gain information relating to the grievance. When judging the good
faith of a union's refusal to prosecute grievances one factor to be considered
is the ease with which information could be gathered. Acme Industrial assists
the union in that regard. Therefore a corresponding increase in willingness
to prosecute an employee's grievance should follow. Where the subject mat-
ter of the contract dispute involves a possible unfair labor practice the union
could avoid the expense of arbitration by proceeding to the NLRB. This will
leave more funds, time and energy available to unions to prosecute those fair
labor practice grievances that in the past may have to have been dropped due
to lack of funds or time.
Other decisions by the NLRB and courts which serve to strengthen the un-
ion's hand in the bargaining process should result in a corresponding increase
of the union's duty of fair representation. Indeed, the NLRB has relied on
the doctrine of fair representation to support a Section 8(a)(5) finding
against an employer who refused to furnish the union a list of the unit em-
ployees' home addresses. The list was sought to aid the union in its negotia-
tion and administration of the collective bargaining contract.15 2  It would
seem justifiable to rely on Section 8(a)(5) and the union's growing power
under that section to develop a theory of a corresponding increase in the duty
of fair representation. However the opposite effect has been the case.
In all cases the aggrieved employee's choice of forum is in federal or state
court or before the NLRB. The remedies available to him will vary with the
severity of the breach of fair representation. Undoubtedly most remedies try
to restore the status quo. Often the breach of fair representation is an out-
growth of loss of seniority leading to discharge or outright discharge itself.
The employer is not blameless, for it is often his conduct, such as discharging
the employee, that will precipitate the union's breach of its duty. One
question is the apportionment of the employee's loss between the employer
and the union. Another issue will be what type of damages are recoverable;
e.g., will malicious conduct by the union warrant punitive damages; will
damages lie for actual loss, mental suffering, attorney's fees, and myriad of
other losses.
152. Prudential Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 928 (1969); Standard Oil Co., 166 N.L.R.B. No. 45 (1967), enforced, 399 F.2d
639 (9th Cir. 1968).
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Substantive and Procedural Obstacles to Recovery
Court suits for breaches of the duty of fair representation will raise proce-
dural problems whether brought in state court, where local rules will govern,
or in federal court, where the parties will be bound by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Preliminary problems of pleading and exhaustion will con-
front the injured employee in his court suit. He will have to weigh many fac-
tors in choosing either a court suit or to proceed before the NLRB. Gener-
ally, in a court suit, the employee will have to allege a breach of contract
by the employer, that he has attempted to exhaust his remedies, and that he
was frustrated in his endeavor by the union whose action amounted to a
breach of his duty of fair representation. How does the employee state his
claim and, once stated, what relief can he get?
The Claim
Where race is alleged to be a consideration in company and union action, the
requirement of exhaustion is narrowly construed. An allegation that a formal
effort to pursue contractual remedies in a racial case will suffice and "no
time consuming formalities" are required' 53  "[But] after the free-hand
given the Union in Humphrey v. Moore . . . and Vaca . . . there is little a
union can do to blunder into liability, except in the case of a personal ven-
detta . . . . [The] effect of substantive limitation placed on judicial inquiry
as to the union's conduct in grievance handling eviscerates the test previously
applied [and] insulates the union and the employer from the average honest
claim and thus deprives the worker of any role in the grievance process
"154
There are judicial techniques available in the application of the standards
to achieve substantial justice. A court may still reverse the decision of the
union or arbitrating committee if based on fraud or deceit, or breach of the
duty of fair representation. But those are not the only grounds whereby an
individual's case can get to a court.
If. . . the private decision complained of is a 'jurisdictional' one-
that a certain dispute will not be considered on its merits by the pri-
153. Glover v. St. Louis Ry., 393 U.S. 324, 331 (1969). Indeed relief may be
sought under the easier standards of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000(e). See Norman v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 414 F.2d 73 (9th Cir. 1969).
It is now clear that neither Title VII nor the Taft-Hartley Act preempts the other.
Farmers Cooperative Compress v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Dobbins
v. Local 212, IBEW, 292 F. Supp. 413 (D.C. Cir. 1968). Thus where race is a factor
the individual grievant may proceed on these theories of recovery, Title VII, Taft-Hart-
ley, or fair representation.
154. Kroner, The Individual Employee-His "Rights" in Arbitration after Vaca v.
Sipes, 20 N.Y.U. CONF. ON LAB. 75, 82-83 (1967).
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vate decision maker-then the court is a proper forum to review
this decision on the basis of its analysis of the contract entered
into by the parties. ... This is particularly true where the court
is convinced that a private procedure used for the determination is
not adequate to decide fairly and fully such an important initial
question.155
The individual's case may not get to court if the power to invoke the
grievance procedure under the contract is given by the contract solely to the
union. The union's good faith settlement of the matter, albeit adverse to the
employee, extinguishes his claim. 156 Another impediment to a court suit by
an employee is the requirement that he first exhaust his remedies under the
contract.' 57 However, if the employer repudiates the grievance provisions of
the contract he is estopped in a suit under Section 301 of Taft-Hartley to as-
sert as a defense the employee's failure to exhaust his contractual reme-
dies.1 58 Absent these types of cases the employee must contend with the
Vaca v. Sipes requirement that the union's action in refusing to prosecute
the employee claim was in bad faith. 15 9
Must a union pursue an appeal of an arbitrator's award against an em-
ployee? If not, may an employee appeal to the courts? In Acuff v. Paper-
makers' 60 the Court held that the union may properly determine not to appeal
an adverse arbitrator's award. Failure to appeal is not conclusive as to in-
adequate representation and the employees have no right to intervene at the
appellate stage under Rule 24(a) of the Federal Rules.' 6 ' "The right to
arbitration is an incident not of the employment relationship as such but of
the collective bargaining relationship."' 62  The decision is a misapplication
of Vaca v. Sipes for that case only applied past cases giving broad discretion to
the union in handling grievances and arbitration. Vaca v. Sipes does not
compel the result reached in Acuff and that decision should not be followed.
The policy of labor peace is encouraged by intervention by the individual for
it provides remedies for dissidents within the union-employer collective-
bargaining structure rather than forcing them out into the streets.
155. Bieski v. Eastern Automobile Forwarding Co., 396 F.2d 32, 38 (3d Cir. 1968).
156. Williams v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 384 F.2d 935 (9th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 987 (1968). See also Brady v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 401 F.2d
87 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 955 (1969) (where an employee recovered
by showing disparate handling of delinquent dues payments).
157. Borne v. Armstrong Cork Co., 384 F.2d 285, 289 (5th Cir. 1967).
158. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
159. 384 F.2d 285, 288-89 (1967). See also Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967);
Union News Co. v. Hildreth, 295 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1961).
160. 404 F.2d 169 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 987 (1969).
161. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a).
162. Acuff v. United Papermakers, 404 F.2d 169, 172 (5th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 987 (1969).
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One rationale for requiring the employer to process grievances arising
under the contract is to preserve the integrity of the bargaining agent as
indicated in Vaca v. Sipes. That policy is not undermined by allowing an
employee to assert a right consistent with the collective bargaining contract.
As the Court said in Smith v. Evening News Association, "Individual claims
lie at the heart of the grievance and arbitration machinery, [and] are to a
large degree inevitably intertwined with union interests .... "163 Where the
individual is asserting a right consistent with the contract, Sections 9(a) and
7 of the Act should give him the right to proceed alone. "To reason other-
wise is to deny the very purpose for which the union exists; that is, the pro-
tection of the rights of the individual employee."'1 64
There has been judicial indication that the finality of arbitration awards
is not always binding on the courts under the Steel Workers Trilogy. For
example, if there is a breach of the duty of fair representation in the arbi-
tration proceeding the courts will entertain such a claim. In Rothlein v.
Armour & Co.,16 'r a suit for accrued pension benefits, the court indicated that
there may be standards in addition to those of bad faith enunciated in Vaca v.
Sipes for judging the validity of a settlement or contractual determination of
the merits of a grievance. The judge should be satisfied that the procedures
for resolution of grievances "is commensurate with the substantiality of the
claim or dispute presented by the employee . . . . If an infirmity less than
[a breach of fair representation] is present, federal labor policy would sug-
gest that the rights of a few . . . be carefully balanced against the concern of
the many .... ,"166 This language suggests a general equity power in
the courts to grant relief in absence of a breach of collective bargaining. The
reluctance of the courts to proceed further is bothersome. The vested rights
theory of Burley1 67 would have been a perfect tool. As Rothlein points out
there is support in Vaca for the proposition "that a union may not arbitrarily
ignore a meritorious grievance or process it in perfunctory fashion. .. .
It is arguable that discharge, seniority rights, and "vested rights" are sub-
jects that require the test of arbitrariness, good faith, and honesty in dealing
be more vigorously applied. The more serious the grievance the less discre-
tion the union should be permitted. If a grievance is traded for benefit to the
unit employee as a whole, the benefit received should be commensurate
with the seriousness of the grievance.
163. 371 U.S. 195, 200 (1962).
164. Illinois Ruan Transport Corp. v. NLRB, 404 F.2d 274, 289 (8th Cir. 1968)
(Lay, J., dissenting).
165. 391 F.2d 574 (3d Cir. 1968).
166. Id. at 580.
167. 325 U.S. 711 (1945).
168. 386 U.S. 171, 191 (1967).
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All courts have not been as generous to the individuals as Rothlien. In
Slogley v. Illinois Central R.R. 169 the court seized on technicality in the plead-
ings to dismiss an employee's suit against his employer for wrongful depriva-
tion of seniority rights and against the union for unlawful discrimination
against him. The court said that "[t]o come within the Maddox-Vaca excep-
tion to the general exhaustion requirement an employee . . . must allege
that he has attempted to utilize the available contract grievance procedure
and that his attempt has been thwarted by union conduct constituting a
breach of the duty of fair representation."' 70 Allegations that the union
action was wrongful, unlawful, arbitrary, capricious were not sufficient to
accomplish that purpose. Such an approach is contrary to the rule- in
Conley v. Gibson' 7' and the intent of the federal rules which only require a
short plain statement sufficient to afford fair notice to the defendant. 172 At
the very least the plaintiff should have been allowed to freely amend his
complaint rather than have it dismissed.'
7 3
The Statute of Limitations Problem
Another issue is the applicability of the statute of limitations if any. Under
Taft-Hartley the individual would be proceeding on a Miranda-Rubber Work-
ers theory and the NLRB's six month statute of limitations would apply.
174
However, in a suit brought under Section 301 Taft-Hartley there is no statute
of limitations enunciated thereby raising the implication that suit may be
begun within a reasonable time. This contention was rejected, however, in
United Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp.175 where, in a suit by the un-
ion on behalf of the employees for wages due under the contract, the Court
held that in absence of a governing federal provision "the timeliness of a § 301
suit . . . is to be determined, as a matter of federal law, by reference to the
appropriate state statute of limitations."'1 76 A further issue is whether a suit
on a breach of a duty of fair representation in federal court is governed by Sec-
tion 10(b) of Taft-Hartley or the state statute as in Hoosier Cardinal or some
other time limit. Certainly if the case were before the NLRB the six month
limitation would apply. Although it may be arguable that in fair representa-
tion cases alone the NLRB could, if it chose to do so, defer to the state statute
of limitations to enable the complainant a longer period in which to bring his
169. 397 F.2d 546 (7th Cir. 1968).
170. Id. at 551-52.
171. 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).
172. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
173. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a); Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
174. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1964); cf. Local 1424, IAM v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 411
(1962).
175. 383 U.S. 697 (1966).
176. Id. at 704-05.
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suit. This is unlikely since there is a federal provision that governs, i.e., Sec-
tion 10(b). One of the difficulties with Vaca is permitting suits against the
union in state and federal courts as well as a proceeding before the NLRB.
The suit is a matter of federal law; presumably if the suit were in state court
it would have to look to substantive federal law for guidance but Hoosier
Cardinal would indicate that the state could apply its own statute of limita-
tions. There is court authority for the proposition that in a suit in federal
court on a theory of breach of fair representation, the federal court must apply
the state statute of limitations. 177 This may not be as simple as it sounds.
It is arguable that since Vaca concedes that a breach of fair representation
may be an unfair labor practice there is a governing federal statute-Section
10(b). Therefore, the reliance by the court in Gray v. Asbestos Workers on
Hoosier Cardinal is arguably misplaced. Rather, in suits in federal or state
courts, those courts must apply the applicable federal law which is a six
month statute of limitations. However, such a policy would be unduly re-
strictive on the individual. The policy underlying Section 10(b) of Taft-
Hartley's six month limitation is to ensure that the federal policy of rapid
disposition of labor disputes to accomplish industrial peace, that goal may not
always be the same as vindication of individual employee rights. 178 There-
fore, from the individual's position the rule in Gray that the state statute of
limitations governs in a fair representation suit in federal court is preferable.
Such a rule may pose a conflict of laws problem where several employees
bring suits on occurrences in several states against the same union. Needless
concern with choice of law problems should not impede recovery. Such prob-
lems posed by the dissent in Hoosier Cardinal could be avoided by utilization
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure dealing with joinder and severance of
actions and parties' 79 which would allow separate suits by the individuals
affected in the forum of their choice thus hopefully obviating choice of law
problems as to the applicable statute of limitations.
Assuming that the state statute of limitations applies to fair representation
suits another issue to be resolved is characterization. How is the suit to be
characterized; is the suit a contractual claim for relief; or is it a claim sound-
ing in tort? In DeArroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse18 0
the court held that a fair representation suit is properly characterized a tort
action and therefore the local statute of limitations regarding torts was to be
applied. The court expressly rejected the argument that Section 10(b) of
177. Gray v. Asbestos Workers Local 51, 416 F.2d 313 (6th Cir. 1969).
178. Local 1424, 1AM v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 411, 428 (1960).
179. FED. R. Civ. P. 18, 20, 21. Cf. UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966);
Sporia v. Greyhound, 143 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1944).
180. 425 F.2d 281 (1st Cir. 1970).
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Taft-Hartley should apply.
Remedial Considerations
The remedy in a fair representation suit may be against the union employer
or both. The test stated in Vaca v. Sipes is "to apportion liability between
the employer and the union according to the damage caused by the fault of
each. Thus damages attributable solely to the employer's breach of contract
should not be charged to the union, but increases if any in those damages
caused by the union's refusal to process the grievance should not be charged
to the employer."' 181 If breaches by both the union and employer are
proven, the court must fashion appropriate remedies.
The court indicated in Vaca that the NLRB is without power to remedy
an employer's breach of contract unless the employer's conduct amounts to a
participation in the union's unfair labor practice.'1 2  As Vaca indicates, the
remedies will vary from case to case. An order compelling arbitration is
one possibility. Remedies of damages on the contractual claim may be al-
lowed. Even if the suit is solely against the union and the employer is not
joined, the union is only liable for those damages that flowed from its wrong-
ful conduct. "Assuming a wrongful discharge by the employer independent
of any discriminatory conduct by the union and a subsequent discriminatory
refusal by the union to process grievances based on the discharge, damages
against the union for loss of employment are unrecoverable except to the ex-
tent that its refusal to handle grievances added to the difficulty and expense
of collecting from the employer."' 83 A union is only liable to the individual
employee for loss of income, less his interim earnings for its share of the
wrong perpetrated on him. In a fair representation suit an employee is not
able to recover damages for humility, embarrassment, or incidential damages
such as loss of home to a mortgage holder.' 84 He is also unable to recover
attorney's fees in a fair representation suit. However, if a right has been vio-
lated it is not merely a private but also a public right and it should be fully Vin-
dicated. Since it is the vindication of a public and statutory policy (that a
union owes a duty of fair representation to the employees it represents) all
impediments of vindication of that policy should be removed. These suits
should be encouraged and a major impetus to accomplishment of this goal
would be to allow a successful employee to recover attorney fees. In one
case under the Railway Labor Act attorney fees were awarded in a fair repre-
181. 386 U.S. 171, 197-98 (1967). Cf. Carroll v. Railroad Trainmen, 417 F.2d
1025 (Ist Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 73 L.R.R.M. 2971 (1970).
182. 386 U.S. at 188 n.12.
183. Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25,29 (1970).
184. St. Clair v. Local 513, Teamsters, 422 F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1969).
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sentation case.' 85 Analogously, stockholders have been awarded attorney
fees for years in stockholders derivative suits on the theory that such suits
should be encouraged to vindicate public rights.' 8 6 The need for allowing at-
torney fees is emphasized by the fact that punitive damages are not allowed
in Section 303 Taft-Hartley suits because that section does not provide for
them.' 8 7 Since Sections 301 and 9 of Taft-Hartley are also silent on the sub-
ject it is doubtful that punitive damages would lie in a suit for breach of a duty
of fair representation. As indicated by Vaca and Czosek v. O'Mara,188 the
normal damages to be assessed will be compensatory in nature. There is
language in Vaca that indicates a possibility of punitive damages in a flagrant
case of breach of duty by union. "[T]he jury awarded compensatory dam-
ages . . .plus punitive damages . . . . We hold that such damages are not
recoverable from the Union in the circumstances of this case."189 If, for
example, malice were involved, punitive damages should be available.' 90
But even if available, punitive and even compensatory damages have been
difficult to collect.1
9 1
Suits under Landrum-Griffin have allowed damages for mental anguish
and injury to reputation.192  Section 102 of Landrum-Griffin' 93 provides for
relief as may be "appropriate" which as a statutory test is similar to that enun-
ciated in Vaca. There is a basis for extensions of remedies to provide for
wrongs in the individual case and in the general area of fair representation
as a whole. To effectively insure full and fair representation, remedies in
suits for breach of the union duty should not exclude punitive damages, nor
be limited to compensatory damages, and should award membership rights in
the appropriate case, and include awarding attorney fees to successful em-
ployees. Courts should be free in the exercise of their general equity power
185. Tischler v. Airline Pilots Ass'n, 67 L.R.R.M. 2579 (D. Fla. 1968); cf. Mc-
Graw v. Plumbers, 341 F.2d 705 (6th Cir. 1965) (denying a jury trial in a suit for
wrongful expulsion). Contra, Boilermakers v. Braswell, 388 F.2d 193 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 391 U.S. 935 (1968); Simmons v. Local 713, Textile Workers Union, 350
F.2d 1012 (4th Cir. 1965).
186. Hornstein, The Counsel Fee in Stock Holder's Derivative Suits, 39 COLUM. L.
REV. 784 (1939). See also Murphy v. North American Light & Power Co., 33 F.
Supp. 567 (S.D.N.Y. 1940), where the court stated, "Allowances in causes of this kind
• .. should not be niggardly for appetite for effort in corporate therapeutics should be
.... encouraged." Id. at 571. See also Pergament v. Kaiser Frazer Corp., 224 F.2d
80 (6th Cir. 1955).
187. Local 20, Teamsters v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252 (1964).
188. 397 U.S. 25 (1970).
189. 386 U.S. 171, 195 (1967).
190. Boilermakers v. Braswell, 388 F.2d 193 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 935
(1968).
191. Herring, The Fair Representation Doctrine: An Effective Weapon Against
Union Racial Discrimination?, 24 MD. L. REV. 113, 144 (1964).
192. Simmons v. Local 713, Textile Workers, 350 F.2d 1012 (4th Cir. 1965).
193. 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1964).
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to award "appropriate" relief.
The First Circuit has taken a long stride toward effective and just relief
for employees unfairly represented.19 4 The court held that not only was back-
pay and reinstatement a proper remedy in a wrongful discharge case but also
that future lost earnings may be allowed, together with attorney fees. Hope-
fully more courts will follow the First Circuit's lead to achieve fairness to the
individual.
If the breach of the union's duty results in a deprivation of "vested rights,"
those and accrued benefits should be treated with preference. If the benefits
are due because of statutory authority it is not necessary to plead a breach of
fair representation if the statute is of a type whereby it cannot be abrogated
by private agreement.195
One other problem remains a source of increased litigation. That is the
problem of the union that wrongfully excludes employees from union mem-
bership. At common law there was no cause of action for wrongful exclu-
sion.196 This concept was retained by Congress when it enacted Taft-Hartley
in 1947. The proviso to Section 8(b)(1)(A) of Taft-Hartley expressly
gives unions plenary authority to set rules for acquisition and retention of
membership. 197 Under Section 8(b)(2) of Taft-Hartley' 98 unions are pro-
hibited from discriminating against nonmembers in the bargaining unit. 199
The fair representation doctrine also requires that the union represent all
employees in the bargaining unit. However, these statutory and interpretive
prohibitions are often insufficient. Wide union discretion, temptations to act
for the politically expedient reason at the expense of the nonunion member,
and difficulties in carrying burdens of proof are reasons to not permit arbi-
trary or wrongful exclusion from membership. "[T]he shadowy right to
'fair representation' by the union . . . is by no means the same as the hard
concrete ability to vote and to participate in the affairs of the union. ' 200
If a union denies an employee admittance to membership and then
flagrantly violates its duty of fair representation a remedy may lie which would
194. DeArroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse, 425 F.2d 281 (1st Cir.
1970).
195. Arguelles v. U.S. Bulk Carriers, Inc., 408 F.2d 1065 (4th Cir. 1969).
196. Summers, The Right to Join a Union, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 33 (1947).
197. It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents
(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaran-
teed in section 7 ...Provided, That this paragraph shall not impair the right
of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisi-
tion or retention of membership therein. ...
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1964).
198. Id. § 158(b) (2) (1964).
199. Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
200. Directors Guild v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. 2d 42, 48 Cal. Rptr. 710 (Sup. Ct.
Cal. 1966).
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deprive the union of its traditional right of freedom of association and restric-
tion of membership. in a concurring opinion in Phalen v. Theatrical Pro-
tective Union,201 Judge Fuld reasoned that this extraordinary remedy
would lie because the union could not, under state law, arbitrarily exclude
an employee from membership. Since the NLRB had no power to order ad-
mittance to membership under the proviso to Section 8(b)(1)(A), the state
was not preempted from ordering a union to admit an employee to member-
ship. Law suits and injunctions under a fair representation theory are no
substitute for the processes of union democracy flowing from membership in
the union. Judge Fuld would require unions to admit all employees to
membership without discrimination and if the union rejects an applicant in
bad faith the state court will order the union to admit him. To use new tech-
niques to curb abuses of union power might be desirable. However, to force
a union to open its membership rolls to all employees may amount to a breach
of the duty of fair representation to its present members. In times of shortage
of work, it would be a serious imposition on the out of work members to be
forced to compete with members imposed on a union by a court order. On
the other hand the remedy in Phalen would only apply in case of drastic or
flagrant abuse of union power. Denial of membership for certain arbitrary
grounds such as race, national origin or sex is already illegal under Title
V11202 and state court action could be a supplement to the congressional
policy embodied there and in the Miranda-Rubber Workers doctrine which
finds an unfair labor practice under Taft-Hartley for arbitrary use of union
power. 203 Individual claims for remedial action are in the main statutory and
will be filed with the NLRB. The issue is whether NLRB remedial power
poses an effective deterrent to abuses of union power.
NLRB Remedies For Breach of Fair Representation
As a procedural and practical matter the NLRB is an attractive forum to en-
force the duty of fair representation when the union's action is arbitrary, in-
vidious, unfair, or based on racial factors. The administrative procedures are
less expensive and more expeditious from a charging party's view point than
a suit in state or federal court. The NLRB is empowered to issue cease and
desist orders204 and to enforce those orders in the circuit courts and Supreme
Court.205 The NLRB also has power to seek injunctions against both em-
201. 22 N.Y.2d 34, 238 N.E.2d 295, 290 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1968).
202. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(2) (1964).
203. Hurwitz v. Directors Guild, 364 F.2d 67 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 971
(1966); cf. Ferger v. Local 483, Ironworkers, 356 F.2d 854 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
384 U.S. 908 (1966).
204. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964).
205. Id. § 160(e).
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ployers and unions.206 The major impetus for individuals to use the NLRB
forum to vindicate their rights is the fact that the NLRB bears the charging
party's costs in proceedings before it and the appellate courts. 20 7  Further-
more, the NLRB's backlog is generally shorter than that of the federal
courts. 20 8 The NLRB's General Counsel has wide discretion in handling
cases but this does not negate the desirability of utilizing the NLRB as an in-
expensive, expeditious forum for vindicating employee rights in fair repre-
sentation matters. The charging party may intervene before the NLRB while
at the same time receiving cost free legal service by the General Counsel's of-
fice. 20 9 If the charging party is aggrieved by the NLRB determination he
may seek judicial review.
210
The Miranda-Rubber Workers line of cases finding a violation of Section
8(b)(2) is also helpful because the NLRB remedy normally is the payment
of lost wages and restoration of the status quo ante.2
11 In Port Drum Co. 2 1 2
the NLRB ordered the union who had breached its duty of fair representation
to arbitrate the employee's grievance. On the subsequent death of the em-
ployee, the NLRB ordered the union to pay the employee's estate for the
period beginning with the date the employee asked the union to grieve on his
behalf and ending with the date of the employee's death. On the other
hand, the NLRB remedies are nonpunitive in nature,2 1 3 and are geared to
restoration of the status quo ante and therefore are ineffective as a positive
deterrent. Reinstatement, backpay with interest, notice posting, and cease
and desist orders are the normal remedies available under the Taft-Hartley
Act. While a contempt citation may result from an NLRB order, the NLRB
is seemingly reluctant to initiate such proceedings and the courts are evidently
unwilling to find contempt. In fiscal year 1968 there was only one case
206. Id. § 160(j).
207. Amalgamated Utility Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U.S. 261,
264-66 (1940). The power to issue complaints and prosecute is vested with the Gen-
eral Counsel. 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1964). See also Mayer v. Ordman, 391 F.2d 889
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 925 (1970). For a review of case handling by the
NLRB see H. SILVERBERG, HOW TO TAKE A CASE BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELA-
TIONs BOARD (1967).
208. Blumrosen, The Worker and Three Phases of Unionism: Administrative and
Judicial Control of the Worker-Union Relationship, 61 MicH. L. REV. 1435, 1514
(1963).
209. Local 283, UAW v. Scofield, 382 U.S. 205, 219 (1966). Cf. Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v. Carpet Layers Local 419, 410 F.2d 1148 (10th Cir.), cert. granted, 396 U.S.
926 (1969).
210. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1964); cf. Pepsico, Inc. v. NLRB, 382 F.2d 265 (6th Cir.
1967); Amalgamated Utility Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U.S. 261
(1940).
211. F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 289 (1950); Isis Plumbing & Heating Co.,
138 N.L.R.B. 716 (1962).
212. 180 N.L.R.B. No. 90 (1970).
213. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938).
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holding a union in contempt.2 14 Further, the NLRB's use of injunctive pro-
ceedings is rare. In cases involving union and employer discrimination un-
der the Act, the NLRB sought only one injunction and that was denied. 215
In the same period of time the NLRB received over 1600 charges alleging
unlawful union discrimination.
216
If the NLRB goes beyond the normal remedial practices they open them-
selves to the charge of punitive damages under the rule in Consolidated Edi-
son.217 Legislation is necessary to provide the NLRB with more effective,
punitive remedial powers such as treble backpay or the power to award
actual damages or monetary penalities or fines for aggravated violations. In
1948, the first fiscal year under the Taft-Hartley Act, the total unfair labor
practice charges filed were 3,302, with 749 of those charges filed against
unions. 218 Twenty years later 17,816 unfair labor practice charges were
filed with the NLRB. The charges filed against unions totalled 5,846.21
9
Even a casual glance at these figures questions the validity of the remedial
policies and power of the agency 220 in correcting abuses of union power.
Revocation of certification and removal of the contract bar as in Pioneer
Bus221 is only effective against weak unions because the unions with economic
strength do not need NLRB certification because by virtue of their power they
are able to obtain voluntary recognition from the employer as the exclusive
representative of the employees. Generally it is not the weak unions who ar-
bitrarily exclude blacks and other employees from membership.222  While
Professors Summers, Sovern, and Cox have debated the issue as to whether
racial discrimination or breach of duty of fair representation is an unfair labor
practice, the debate is meaningless when the ineffective remedial policies
and provisions under the Taft-Hartley Act are considered.
In NLRB v. Tiidee Products, Inc.223 the court recognized that the normal
214. 33 NLRB ANN. REP. 340 (1968).
215. Id. at 242. But see Little v. Portage Realty Co., 73 L.R.R.M. 2971 (N.D. Ind.
1970) (where the court granted an injunction directing an employer to bargain with
the union).
216. 33 NLRB ANN. REP. 203 (1968).
217. 305 U.S. 197 (1938).
218. 13 NLRB ANN. REP. 6 (1948).
219. 33 NLRB ANN. REP. 203 (1968).
220. An extensive review of NLRB remedies can be found in an address by NLRB
member John Fanning, before the Fifth Annual Labor Relations Institute in Atlanta,
Ga. on November 21, 1968. 1968 LABOR RELATIONS YEARBOOK 164 (1969).
221. 140 N.L.R.B. 54 (1962).
222. Sovern, Race Discrimination and the National Labor Relations Act: The
Brave New World of Miranda, 16 N.Y.U. CONF. ON LAB. 3 (1963).
223. 73 L.R.R.M. 2870 (D.C. Cir. 1970); cf. Teamsters Local 992 v. NLRB, 73
L.R.R.M. 2924 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Food Store Employees 347 v. NLRB, 74 L.R.R.M.
2109 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See also St. Antoine, A Touchstone for Labor Board Reme-
dies, 14 WAYNE L. REV. 1039 (1968). Cf. NLRB v. Strong Roofing & Ins. Co., 393
U.S. 357 (1969); NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
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NLRB cease and desist order affords only prospective relief, rewards parties
for their wrongdoing and encourages frivolous litigation. Effective redress to
a statutory wrong should both compensate the party wronged and withhold
from the wrongdoer the fruits of his violation. The court ordered the NLRB
on remand to frame its remedy to encompass past damages. A union that
breaches its duty of fair representation reaps a benefit in subverting employees
to its interests or being able by its wrongful actions to perpetuate itself in of-
fice. If remedies are not devised to prevent fair representation breaches
at the NLRB level, the NLRB shortcomings will have the effect of clogging
court calendars thus diverting judicial attention from more pressing matters
that are before the court. The court held in Tiidee Products, that the Act is
effectuated by an award of damages by the NLRB. In cases of flagrant
abuse of union discretion the NLRB should accept the mandate of the court
in Tiidee Products and go beyond the routine cease and desist order. They
may also suggest a make-whole order or even a Port Drum remedy of order-
ing the union to arbitrate in cases where it wrongfully refuses to do so. The
remedy should first compensate the aggrieved employee for all his losses
legitimately, foreseeably, and reasonably flowing from the union's breach of its
duty, and second, the remedy should serve to deter future similar conduct
in which the public has a definite interest. As quoted by the court in Tiidee
Products, "In the evolution of the law of remedies some things are bound to
happen for the 'first time.' "224
In those situations where the union violates its duty, appropriate and de-
terrent remedies are necessary to insure that similar conduct does not re-
occur. Loss of job or important seniority status, threats to an employee's
financial solvency, and resultant emotional distress may be significant It
may be specious to think that a union who has already demonstrated its hos-
tility to an individual will vigorously represent him without the NLRB looking
over its shoulder. Port Drum raises practical difficulties for a union if the
employer refuses to arbitrate. The union would have to bring a Section 301
suit to comply with the NLRB order, for it has never been held that a refusal
to arbitrate by an employer is a violation of Section 8(a) (5). The traditional
remedy is a Section 301 suit.225 The NLRB has long held that the union's
duty of fair representation contemplates that the employee's interests will
be vigorously defended and the employee's cause fully and fairly litigated. 226
224. International Bhd. of Operative Potters v. NLRB, 320 F.2d 757, 761 (D.C.
Cir. 1963).
225. Succession Mario Mercade & Hijos, 161 N.L.R.B. 696 (1966) Hortex Mfg.
Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1151 (1964), afj'd 343 F.2d 329 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Textron Puerto
Rico, 107 N.L.R.B. 583 (1953). Cf. Local 611, Chemical Workers, 123 N.L.R.B. 1507,
1508 (1959).
226. Precision Fittings Corp., 141 N.L.R.B. 1034, 1041-42 (1963); Raytheon Co.,
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Obviously the taking of an adverse position and misrepresentation to an im-
partial panel whose duty it is to decide the grievance is not a vigorous de-
fense,227 and appropriate remedies should lie.
Conclusions
The standards of fair representation have been enunciated by the NLRB and
the courts. Apparently no distinction is to be drawn between discharge and
nondischarge cases. The individual has to meet a considerable burden to
prove his case. The standards of good faith, while necessarily vague, afford
unions considerable latitude and discretion. A broad policy basis for allo-
cating such discretion to unions has been aptly stated by Professor Summers:
Bargaining is a process of exchange, compromise and surrender of
a multitude of claims and the parties are concerned with finding a
formula for settlement. For the courts to weigh too closely the
allocation of the benefits among the employees would plunge the
courts into a task far beyond their competence and seriously hinder
the parties in reaching an agreement.
228
The problem remains a proper balancing of interests to achieve the policy
alluded to by Professor Summers and that of ensuring that the individual em-
ployee has effective, full, and fair representation. Adjudications necessarily
proceed on a case by case basis, particularly in the initial stages of applica-
tion of judicially imposed standards. The true rule of law is developed out
of a series of ad hoc decisions. It is "the anguish of judgment"2 29 in the final
analysis that will determine the issue.
The courts can devise effective remedies without rejecting Vaca as Jus-
tice Douglas' opinion in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills 230 indicates.
The Act "expressly furnishes some substantive law. It points out what the
parties may or may not do in certain situations. Other problems will lie in the
penumbra of expressed statutory mandate. Some will lack expressed statu-
tory sanction but will be solved by looking at the policy of the legislation
and fashioning a remedy that will effectuate that policy. The range of judi-
cial inventiveness will be determined by the nature of the problem."'23 1 It will
140 N.L.R.B. 883, 886-87 (1963); International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923, 928
(1962). Cf. Local 469, Plumbers, 149 N.L.R.B. 39, 46 (1964).
227. Local 12, Plumbers, 152 N.L.R.B. 1093 (1965); Yuba Consolidated Industries,
136 N.L.R.B. 683 (1962).
228. Summers, Collective Bargaining and Individual Rights in the Collective
Agreement-A Comparison of Swedish and American Law, 72 YALE L.J. 421, 434
(1963).
229. Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV.
527, 544 (1947).
230. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
231. Id, at 457.
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be up to the courts to preserve the rights of the individual when they are pitted
against the interests of the economic giants, big business and big labor. It
is within the broad range of equity power possessed by the courts that this
goal can be accomplished.
Robert J. Deeny
